Program Design Snapshot: State Buy-In Programs for Children by Dawn C. Horner
 
 
November 2008 
Program Design Snapshot:  
State Buy-In Programs for Children 
 
 
Description 
A child buy-in program allows families with 
incomes in excess of a state’s Medicaid/ 
SCHIP eligibility levels to purchase insurance 
for their children through the public plan. 
Generally a buy-in program requires families 
to pay what the state pays for the coverage 
and, in some instances, the program’s 
administrative costs.  
 
Buy-in programs are designed to address 
coverage needs among more moderate-
income children whose families do not have 
access to affordable private coverage. Buy-in 
programs can offer children the same 
comprehensive set of benefits offered through 
the state programs. Many of these programs 
are new and enrollment in buy-in programs, 
even the more established ones, has been 
relatively low. Buy-in programs have the 
potential to play an important role in reaching 
universal coverage for children, but only if it 
is coupled with strategies to make the 
premiums affordable for families.  
 
Where States Stand1 
Child buy-in programs have existed since 
before the implementation of SCHIP, and at 
least eight states have operated a program for 
ten years or more (Connecticut, Florida, 
Maine, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New 
York, North Carolina, and Wisconsin). In 
addition, a new wave of states has 
implemented child buy-in programs, 
including Illinois, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, 
and Tennessee, and other states are planning 
or interested in doing the same.  
 
Buy-in programs do not use federal Medicaid 
and SCHIP funds and do not operate under 
federal Medicaid or SCHIP rules. As a result, 
states have significant flexibility in how they 
operate a buy-in program, including the 
benefits offered and cost-sharing 
requirements. Generally, however, child buy-
in programs mirror a state’s SCHIP and/or 
Medicaid program by offering the same 
benefits package. This allows a state to 
implement a single outreach message that 
health coverage is available to all children, 
minimizes family confusion about program 
differences (especially when transferring from 
SCHIP when a family’s income increases), 
and saves on administrative costs associated 
with having a separate application and 
administrative process. Additional program 
elements include:  
 
 Income Eligibility: Most states allow 
families with incomes above their 
Medicaid/SCHIP program levels, with no 
upper income cap, to enroll in the buy-in 
program. A few states, however, have 
limited eligibility. New Hampshire has set 
income eligibility from 300 percent to 400 
percent of the federal poverty level (FPL). 
At least three states, Maine, Minnesota, 
and North Carolina, limit eligibility to 
children who were enrolled in the state 
Medicaid/SCHIP program but no longer 
qualify due to increases in family income. 
 
 Administration: Most states’ child buy-
in programs operate under the same 
administrative structure as the SCHIP 
program, utilizing the same vendors 
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(some even the same contracts) for the 
buy-in population. Similarly, state staff 
that perform administrative functions for 
the SCHIP program, play the same role 
for the buy-in, although without federal 
financial support. Families applying for 
the buy-in primarily do so through the 
same application for Medicaid and SCHIP 
(although some states, such as New 
Hampshire and New Jersey, utilize a 
separate application).  
 
 Flexibility: Since buy-in programs 
receive no federal funding, states have 
flexibility in designing the programs, such 
as establishing different renewal 
procedures and allowing immigrant 
children to apply. For example, as with a 
regular insurance product, some states 
(Maine, New York, North Carolina, and 
New Hampshire) have no annual renewal 
requirements for families. A family stays 
enrolled in the program as long as they 
continue to pay premiums or unless they 
request a new eligibility assessment if 
they believe their child is eligible for 
Medicaid or SCHIP. 
 
 Premium Levels: Monthly premium costs 
for child buy-in programs vary 
considerably from state-to-state and are 
largely dependent on a state’s health care 
market and how the buy-in program is 
structured. As a whole, however, 
premiums for buy-in programs are 
substantially higher than Medicaid/SCHIP 
premiums and represent a large share of 
family income.2 Buy-in programs have the 
potential to offer families a lower 
premium level than what is available in 
the private market because of 
administrative efficiencies and the size 
and composition of the risk pool (some 
states group the buy-in population with 
other publicly covered children which 
increases the size of the risk pool and 
tends to reduce premiums for the buy-in 
population). However, how buy-in 
program premiums compare to coverage 
on the individual market will differ by 
state and any assessment must include a 
comparative review of program benefits 
and cost-sharing requirements. 
 
 Enrollment/Time Limit: No state has a 
limit on the number of enrollees in its 
program. Florida’s buy-in program had a 
cap of 10 percent of its SCHIP (MediKids 
and Healthy Kids) enrollment, however, 
in 2008 the state eliminated the cap.3 
Generally, states do not limit the amount 
of time a child can stay enrolled in the 
buy-in program (with the exceptions of 
Maine and North Carolina which target 
children transitioning off 
SCHIP/Medicaid and have a maximum 
limit of 18 months and 12 months 
respectively). Unlike SCHIP, there is 
usually no premium grace period for buy-
in programs if the state is not providing 
any direct subsidies. As such, if a family 
does not pay a monthly premium, the 
child or children are immediately 
disenrolled from the program. 
 
Issues to Consider 
 
Program Impact: To date, enrollment in 
child buy-in programs has been relatively 
small. According to 2005 data from six state 
child buy-in programs, enrollment as a 
percent of the SCHIP population ranged from 
less than one percent in Connecticut to up to 
10 percent in Florida.4 In addition, analysis by 
the Urban Institute shows that enrollment in 
buy-in programs is low compared to the size 
of the targeted uninsured population, ranging 
from eight to 11 percent of eligible children in 
selected states.5  
 
There could be a number of reasons for low 
enrollment in buy-in programs, including 
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program design and the extent to which the 
programs are marketed. In addition, it is likely 
that the premium levels (especially if similar 
coverage is available on the individual market 
at a comparable cost) may deter enrollment. 
Additional research is needed on this topic but 
cost-sharing experiences in Medicaid/SCHIP 
programs provide some insight: studies 
consistently show that higher premium 
requirements in Medicaid/SCHIP can depress 
enrollment.6  
 
Thus, if the goal of the buy-in program is to 
provide coverage to all uninsured children, a 
state will want to consider using state dollars 
to directly subsidize the premium and/or 
administrative costs for families within the 
lower income bands. For example, 
Connecticut and Minnesota use state funds to 
pay administrative costs and Illinois has 
integrated a premium sliding-scale approach 
into its All Kids program. Under Illinois’ 
program, Medicaid and SCHIP cover children 
up to 200 percent of the FPL, while a buy-in 
program is offered for all other uninsured 
children. Those with family income between 
200 to 400 percent of the FPL receive a state-
funded subsidy to lower the premium amount 
from $15 to $70 per child per month, 
depending on income. Those with family 
income above 400 percent of the FPL pay the 
buy-in program’s premium costs to the state, 
which range from $100 to $300 per child per 
month.7  
 
Conversely, a state could implement a 
Medicaid/SCHIP expansion as an alternative 
to a buy-in program, especially for children 
with lower family incomes. As of October 
2008, 10 states have implemented 
Medicaid/SCHIP expansions to children with 
family income up to 300 percent of the FPL 
and three states provide coverage to children 
with family income above to 300 percent of 
the FPL. Many more states have enacted 
legislation and are planning expansions.8 (See 
http://ccf.georgetown.edu/index/medicaid-
and-schip-programs for Medicaid/SCHIP 
eligibility levels by states.)  
 
Adverse Selection: Adverse selection occurs 
when children enrolling in a program have 
health care costs greater than those expected 
for the broader population of children. 
Adverse selection tends to occur in any 
voluntary insurance program and is dependent 
on a number of factors, including the 
premium structure and the availability of 
guaranteed issue in the individual market. 
There is very limited research on the extent of 
adverse selection in child buy-in programs 
and it clearly requires more study. One of the 
few studies available is a 2005 report of 
Florida’s buy-in program (which is available 
to children with family income above 200 
percent of the FPL). The report showed that 
Florida’s buy-in population’s costs were roughly
twice as expensive, on average, than the 
subsidized SCHIP population.9 However, since 
the targeted populations are different, it is 
unclear to what extent this is evidence of 
adverse selection. For a further discussion on 
the factors affecting adverse selection see: 
State Buy-In Programs: Prospects and 
Challenges by The Urban Institute 
(http://www.urban.org/health_policy/url.cfm?
ID=411795). 
 
While a buy-in program may experience some 
adverse selection, they also have the potential 
to meet an important policy objective—to 
provide an insurance option to children with 
high health care needs. A state implementing 
a buy-in program will want to consider how 
to mitigate the effect of adverse selection to 
make the program sustainable, and ultimately 
how much adverse selection it can tolerate. 
 
One way in which a state can address adverse 
selection is to ensure that the premium costs 
are not too high. The number and type of 
participants who are likely to enroll in 
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coverage is largely a function of the premium 
amount. As premium levels increase, healthier 
people are more likely to drop coverage, 
while a sicker population would be willing to 
pay more.10 Thus states will want to consider 
setting the premium level as low as possible, 
potentially through state subsidies, to create a 
large enough pool of enrollees to limit the risk 
of adverse selection.  
 
Another option is for states to implement the 
Family Opportunity Act (FOA). In February 
2006, as part of the Deficit Reduction Act, 
Congress provided states with a new buy-in 
program option for children.11 The FOA 
allows states to offer families with income 
below 300 percent of the FPL the opportunity 
to buy into Medicaid on a sliding scale if their 
child has a disability.12 Since the benefits in 
Medicaid are more generous and premiums 
are subsidized with federal and state dollars, 
families with disabled children would more 
likely choose enrollment in the Medicaid buy-
in program. 
 
The Welcome Mat Effect: Buy-in programs 
have the potential to positively effect 
enrollment of children who are eligible for 
Medicaid and SCHIP but uninsured. Data 
indicates that “putting out the welcome mat” 
by offering affordable coverage options to 
uninsured children at higher income levels 
can have a powerful effect on the enrollment 
of already-eligible uninsured children.13 
Pennsylvania and Illinois implemented their 
buy-in programs as part of a greater “all kids” 
coverage strategy and subsequently 
experienced large enrollment gains from the 
eligible but uninsured population. In Illinois, 
68 percent of new enrollments from 
November 2005 to June 2008 were previously 
eligible but not enrolled.14 In Pennsylvania, 
59 percent of new enrollments from February 
2007 to June 2008 were previously eligible 
but not enrolled.15 
Achieving this success however requires that 
a state adequately market the buy-in program 
and implement it within the context of a 
“cover all kids” message. For more 
information see Putting Out the Welcome 
Mat: Implications for Coverage Expansions 
for Already-Eligible Children 
(http://ccf.georgetown.edu/index/strategy-
center).  
 
Crowd-Out: Because enrollment levels have 
been so low to date, crowd out has only been 
a minor concern to states.16 As with SCHIP, 
some child buy-in programs require “waiting 
periods,” i.e. a child must have had no health 
insurance, with exceptions, at the time of 
enrollment for a specified period of time, 
ranging from three months up to 12 months in 
Illinois and Florida. However, any policy that 
leaves children uninsured for a period of time 
should be considered in the context of the 
health consequences and financial costs 
associated with no access to health care 
during the waiting period. See Program 
Design Snapshot: Public Coverage Waiting 
Periods for Children 
(http://ccf.georgetown.edu/index/strategy-
center).  
 
Conclusion 
Child buy-in programs offer states another 
option for providing health coverage to 
children with moderate family incomes, and 
as a result, increasing coverage to those with 
lower family incomes. Enrollment in the 
programs, however, has been limited to date, 
due in part to the high premiums that families 
must pay. Only a few states have decreased 
premiums through the use of state subsidies, 
but the effectiveness of buy-in programs as a 
universal coverage option may not be 
achieved without such assistance. 
 
 
Center for Children and Families  Georgetown University Health Policy Institute        5 
 
November 2008 
For More Information 
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http://www.urban.org/health_policy/url.cfm?ID=411795. 
 
• SCHIP Buy-in Programs, National Academy for State Health Policy, 2006 
http://www.nashp.org/Files/SCHIP_Buy-in_programs_2006.pdf  
 
• Full-Cost Buy-Ins: An Overview of State Experience, State Coverage Initiatives, 2001 
http://www.statecoverage.net/pdf/issuebrief801.pdf  
 
• Full-Cost Buy-In Options for Optimizing Coverage through NJ FamilyCare, State of New Jersey in 
collaboration with Rutgers Center for State Health Policy, 2006 
http://www.cshp.rutgers.edu/DOWNLOADS/6160.PDF  
 
• State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) Buy-in Programs, Report of the Department of 
Medical Assistance Services to the Governor and the General Assembly of Virginia, 2006 
http://www.dmas.virginia.gov/downloads/studies_reports/2006-HD48_SCHIP.pdf  
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